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Abstract
The mind-body problem lies at the heart of the clinical practice of both psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. In
their recent publication, Schwartz and Wiggins address the question of how to understand life as central to the
mind-body problem. Drawing on their own use of the phenomenological method, we propose that the
mind-body problem is not resolved by a general, evocative appeal to an all encompassing life-concept, but rather
falters precisely at the insurmountable difference between “natural” and a “reflective” experience built into
phenomenological method itself. Drawing on the works of phenomenologically oriented thinkers, we describe life
as inherently “teleological” without collapsing life with our subjective perspective, or stepping over our
epistemological limits. From the phenomenology it can be demonstrated that the hypothetical teleological
qualities are a reflective reconstruction modelled on human behavioural structure.
I. Introduction
In their recent paper Michael A. Schwartz and Osborne
P. Wiggins [1] discuss the difficulty of integrating herme-
neutical/teleological and scientific/biological approaches
to understanding living beings. They point out that tradi-
tional solutions so far as they presuppose “metaphysical
dualism” fail to integrate these perspectives due to their
inability “to explain the relationship between mind and
body [...] because it was obvious from our own daily
experience that mind and body were intimately united.”
Moreover, they contend that our culture crossed a point
of no return with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Accord-
ing to Schwartz and Wiggins, we are no longer able to
keep the two perspectives of our life separate. Neverthe-
less, we would like to point out that human cognitive
development is characterized by a fundamental “common
sense dualism” between mind and body [2-4]. This
“common sense dualism” is therefore so built-in or
accustomed, or as we like to say, “embodied” in a funda-
mental sense. As Hume argued, it prereflectively deter-
mines our reflective experiences: “Custom operates
before we have time for reflexion.” [[5], p. 72] Despite
well-meaning efforts of researchers and philosophers to
view the mind and brain as ultimately the same, the ten-
dency towards a dualistic thinking is nearly intractable.
Moreover, this deeply embedded common-sense dual-
ism is reflected in the blockbuster hits like “Matrix” [6]
or online games like “World of Warcraft,” albeit as
expressed in terms of a virtual reality. These postmodern
myths suggest that we are able to transform our experi-
ence of self as if it were merely a matter of changing the
“software.” That is, we seem to find ourselves in the
midst of a prevailing cultural “hysteria” in response to
the recent advances in neuroscientific research. The lat-
ter is often interpreted as inevitably leading to a neuro-
biological determinism, be it feared or revered as an
ultimate solution, whether one chooses to side with its
proponents or opponents [7]. The recent blockbuster
“Avatar” goes even further. In “Departure to Pandora” [8],
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through mind-travel by employing highly sophisticated
technology. With the help of a (herbal) biological mega-
network the Na’vi (indigenous to the planet Pandora and a
kind of noble savage) make the bodiless mind-travel of a
young marine (protagonist of the story) able to take up
permanent residence in his avatar-body. “Pandora” there-
fore may express the cultural wish to no longer be bur-
dened by the human reflective experience of a nearly
intractable dual relation to our own bodies in nearly every
sphere of experience.
We agree with Schwartz and Wiggins on the point
that metaphysical dualism is not able to explain the
incongruity between mind and body, but question
whether they are correct when claiming that Darwin’s
theory of evolution marks what we call here a point of
no return to “Pandora”, a land of animism and metaphy-
sical-commonsensical dualism?
II. Phenomenology: Assuming a Methodically
Critical Attitude
We raise the following question in this paper: Are the epis-
temological limits of consciousness the crucial point
in defining this point of no return to metaphysical-
commonsensical dualism? We shift the focus of argument
to the following question: Why are we no longer able to
hold onto our original commonsense dualism when
approaching these topics scientifically? For example, many
contemporary neuroscientists insist that phenomenal
(mental) experiences (qualia) are materially identical to the
underlying neural processes but then are unable to explain
how this occurs. This is the well-known “explanatory gap”
[9] or the “hard problem” of mind-body-duality. Our pri-
mary point here, and one that Schwartz and Wiggins have
themselves often reiterated in their writings: whenever we
make generalizations about human experience, i.e., propo-
sitional statements about the nature of human subjectivity,
we should be able to recount in a methodological manner
how we arrived at these conclusions. Husserl’s phenomen-
ological approach is helpful here because he sees phenom-
enology as critique in two ways [10]: 1) as critique of
assumptions which uncritically inform theoretical models
of human subjectivity; and 2) as “critique” (in the Kantian
sense) in the sense of being able to recount the necessary
conditions of possibility in human subjectivity for any
knowledge claim to take place. Here Husserl, the founder
of the phenomenological method, applies his pheno-
menological “reductions” (literally a leading-back from the
original Latin, see below) including his genetic phenomen-
ological approach, which uncovers the passive-automatic
(pre-reflective) processes [see also [11-13]], which inform
human cognition.
In the wake of Kant’s critical philosophy, the celebrated
German lyrical poet, Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843)
examined how human reflection inevitably takes itself
into account when approaching its own claims of knowl-
edge with regard to pre-reflective human experience.
According to the contemporary philosopher, D. Henrich
[14], Hölderlin for the first time depicts in his philosophi-
cal fragment “Urtheil und Seyn” (“Judgment and Being,“
1794/95), “reflection as an active step towards a ground,
which in itself is not knowledge but nevertheless serves
as the immanent basis for this knowing” [[14], pp.
99-100, our translation] Similarly, the celebrated founder
of psychosomatic medicine in Germany, Viktor von
Weizsäcker [15] (see also below) describes subjectivity as
a “fundamental relationship” (Grundverhältnis) to experi-
ence which simultaneously does not know itself. Accord-
ing to these thinkers, it is of crucial importance to
remain aware of these limits especially when transferring
concepts from their formulation in reflective or scientific
contexts back to some kind of putative anchoring in our
naïve unreflected experience.
Relying on the prior work of Dilthey and Weber, Jas-
pers [16] emphatically pointed to the differences
between methods of the human sciences (Geisteswis-
senschaften) and those of the natural sciences. However,
this methodic opposition, which is merely a nod to
commonsensical mind-body dualism (or the so-called
explanatory gap) is not satisfactory. We are convinced
that it is important to adopt (and retain) a “methodically
critical attitude” (in German, “methodenkritische
Einstellung”, see [17]), i.e., an attitude which is critically
aware of the methods it employs and the inhering limits
of these methods. Importantly, this critical attitude does
not itself yield to either side in the debate between the
human and natural sciences. In describing this attitude,
we rely on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.
T h el a t t e ri st ob eu n d e r s t o o da sa“critical attitude”
rather than a “tool-box,” which is able to produce mani-
fest results that are comparable to, or on a par with the
experimental findings of cognitive science/neuroscience.
Despite Jaspers pointing to the methodic opposition
between the human and natural sciences, this critical
attitude is advocated by the later Jaspers [18]. We sug-
gest that it is precisely this critical attitude that is funda-
mental to the phenomenological position.
The phenomenologic-critical methodic attitude allows
us to track abstract constructs such as metaphysical-
commonsensical dualism as somehow inserted in the
difference between our ‘natural-naive experience’ and
our reflection on this experience. Phenomenological
reduction is a “leading back” (from the Latin reducere)
from one’s current engagement with the world to exam-
ine (reflectively) the “streaming-consciousness” in the
here and now; this requires the bracketing of common
sense folk-psychological/folk-physical assumptions about
how minds and objects behave in the world. That is, in
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ping back from natural engagement with the world, ima-
ginitively varying (eidetic reduction; Wesensschau),
abstracting, attempting to verbally “fix” (Husserl) in
descriptive language, phenomenology implements reflec-
tion, which is always retrospective to the experience it
reflects on, as its sole instrument [19]. Following Hus-
serl, making propositional statements about the nature
of human subjectivity requires that we critically reflect
on our own assumptions, thought processes and conclu-
sions. This implies that we are not able to state meta-
physical facts, but can only describe the structure of
“how” our experiences and experienced things are
given to us. We therefore introduce this methodical
caveat as segway into our following discussion of the
mind-body-problem, teleological life-qualities, and how
these become available to the methodologic distinction
between the “natural” and “reflective” experience.
Eccentric positionality and its impact for mental
disturbances:
We remain agnostic whether reflection introduces
the gap between mind and body or rather itself
becomes possible because the split is already there
pre-reflectively (for Husserl’s view, see [19]). The
phenomenological anthropologic thinker, H. Plessner
argues that the human condition is characterized by
an ambiguous relationship to one’s own body, the
fact that one can experience one’s own body as both
subject and object, which Plessner calls “eccentric”
or “broken” positionality: “If the life of the animal is
centric, then the life of the human, without able to
break through this centric orientation, is, at the
same time, outside it, eccentric...” [[20], pp. 291-292,
our translation]. Eccentric positionality, “human
being-in-the-world,” is the paradoxical relationship
to our own embodiment as being both embedded in
situations and outside them, as external to the vital
centric-viewpoint, experiencing ourselves from with-
out [21]. That is, the ability to explicitly reflect on
our experience and commonsensical mind-body
dualism may emerge from the same source, human
eccentric positionality, which is already preformed
via the pre-reflective structure including our body
and customs as can be especially seen in addictive
behaviour [22]. Eccentric positionality is also the
condition of human vulnerability to trauma [23] and
psychosis [24,25].
III. The “Mind-Body-Problem”
The importance of debating the mind-body-problem
becomes clear when considering what Schwartz and
Wiggins write about the phenomenon of “life” in their
article. When trying to grasp “life”, we find ourselves
faced with the problem of “natural vs. reflective” experi-
ence. Schwartz and Wiggins [1] observe: “we can claim
privileged access: since we are living beings ourselves, we
know what it means to be alive from our own first-hand
experience.” In our opinion this privileged access does
n o tc h a n g eo rs o l v et h ep r o b l e m ,b u ti st h ee s s e n t i a l
basis for having the problem.
After all, Schwartz and Wiggins’ statement: “Every
moment of our waking lives we directly experience life,
life in ourselves and in others” is a truism. On the other
hand, it is a claim about our pre-reflective experience
that cannot be verified reflectively. To say that we
“directly” experience our own living from moment to
moment suggests that some kind of sentience of life
must accompany each of our cognitions, a statement that
requires verification. In his “Material Phenomenology,”
the French theist philosopher, Michel Henry [26] pro-
poses that “[l]ife is a how, both a mode of revelation and
revelation itself” ( p .1 1 9 ) .Y e t ,w em u s tb ev e r yc a r e f u l
here to guard against Henry’s metaphysical conclusion
(not based on the phenomenological method): that since
we are alive we have immediate access to our own “how”
as transcendental condition for this living. In his writings,
Henry repeatedly makes the methodic mistake of confus-
ing phenomenologic method for results. Henry [27]
claims this presupposed immediate access to the “how”
of our naïve pre-reflective experience as passive auto-
affection. However, this “how” is only made available as a
verbal-abstraction subsequent to phenomenological
reduction and therefore heavily laden with reflection’s
own armour. Henry’s position apparently requires that
the reflective and the pre-reflective quality of experiences
would be the same as if the reflecting subject could fold
back on itself and somehow be the same in both the pre-
reflective and reflective perspectives, despite the “delay”
that the reflection itself requires.
As already stated, we are clearly alive, and in the
instance of bringing this fact into our focus, we are retro-
spectively referring to our own experience. In doing so
we are unable to bring the act of the hyperbolic-reflecting
itself (being itself the focusing) into focus. Of course, this
argument seems to be in danger of “infinite regress” and
to call for fundamental scepticism. However, we do not
agree with this point for the following reason. Having pri-
vileged access, we are inevitably alive in the fullest sense
while experiencing this privileged access. But even though
b e i n ga l i v ei nt h ef u l l e s ts e n s e ,w ea r eu n a b l et oo b t a i na
“full picture” of this living itself, i.e., having “immediate”
access to this life as a totality without some sort of cogni-
tive, affective or interoceptive mediation. After all, any
reflective access to our own living as a totality must be a
retrospective pars pro toto relation to this totality. Some-
thing is always left out within this act of reflection
namely the antecedent, pre-reflective basis of conscious
Schlimme et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:15
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/15
Page 3 of 8experience which is not available to this reflecting except
as a “decaying” retention sinking into the, what Husserl
calls, the “night of the unconscious” [28,11]. Even if I
claim that I am always interoceptively aware of my own
body in its inner milieu as the presupposed “background”
of each conscious now, it is still pars pro toto. To put it
simply: though the “natural experience” is given fully to
the subjective perspective engrossed in this experience, it
cannot be taken fully into account. Because our position-
ality is ultimately ec-centric (Plessner, see below), even
with respect to our own embodied living, we may not so
easily dismiss, or presume to solve the mind-body-
problem [see also [29,30]]. It continues to be the “hard
problem”. The German philosophical anthropologist,
Helmuth Plessner distinguished being a body as subject
( L e i b - s e i n )f r o mh a v i n go n e ’s body as object (Körper-
haben). Human subjectivity is Leib im Körper, that is, the
body as subject (Leib)i sl o d g e di nb u tn o tc o i n c i d e n t
with our awareness of the “same” body as object (Körper):
“The person is always subjectively lived body (Leib) (with
head, trunk, appendages and all that such experiencing
includes) - even if this same individual is convinced that
his own immortal ‘soul’ is also present inside his Leib -
and, at the same time, he has this body as corporeal
object (Körper).” [[31], p. 43 our translation]. “My embo-
died being-in-the-world as self-transcendent is ec-static,
prospectively open and vulnerable to the not-yet-known
in a way that extends beyond my experience of having a
‘self-enclosed body image’.” [[32], p. 621]. The fundamen-
tally human relationship to body is ambiguous in that we
are able to shift frame of reference with regard to the
“same body": we are able to take on both an internal-vital
(i.e., proprioceptiveinteroceptive) and external (extero-
ceptive, social-objectifying) relationship to our own
bodies. The latter is experienced as a self-enclosed entity
in that I take an external or exteroceptive relationship to
my own body as “object,” anticipating its totality as
others might experience/see it. Although the term “body
ownership” has become quite fashionable in recent phe-
nomenologic and neuroscientific writings, this is not
quite correct. It is not merely that I “have” (or “own”)
this body or my body image (which is exteroceptively
given to me, but also imagined as object). It is not just
“mine” (exclusively my province, accessible only to me as
my own interoceptive experiences are) but is also how I
imagine others to experience me. As Plessner writes: “The
visual presenting of my body to myself, always an exter-
nal relationship, obtains a main role in conveying a total-
impression to myself, but mainly of the frontal part of
the body, and with the important exception of the head,
and the region decisive for social contact [and reciprocity
of perspectives], the face...With this visual incomplete-
ness..., especially the invisibility of one’s own face, we
come to...the image of our own bodies (Leibimago)” [[33],
vol. 8, pp. 292-3 (cited and trans by Mishara [21])].
It is possible that those who argue that the naively or
naturally experiencing pre-reflective subject has direct
sentience of its own living from moment to moment
may want to base their argument on claiming that this
persistent life-sentience is given in the background as a
kind of interoception in each conscious experience. The
latter would indicate that these experiences are infused
with a sense of “mineness” as a kind of tacit “ownership”
of the experiences in interoceptive pre-reflective self-
affection. This point of view was recently proposed by
E. Thompson [34]. There are three problems with this
view: 1) how could we know in the sense of an explicit
knowledge this without first reflecting on it and thus
thematically produce the very interoceptive experience
we claim to be there in the background before the
reflecting? Such putative requisite prereflective life-sen-
tience is not available to the reflective-phenomenological
method of “reduction"; 2) Since the subject is already
experiencing these experiences, why is there the addi-
tional requirement that these experiences be “tagged” as
“mine,” the so-called experience of “ownership,” in what
is an unnecessary, nonparsimonious redundacy? Such
tagging would be relevant rather to an episodic memory
system after the fact which implicates a remembered,
embodied and situated self apart from current experien-
cing, e.g., Tulving’s “time travel” [35], see below. This
relevance can be especially seen when functions of the
episodic memory are impaired, e.g. in frontotemporal
lobar degeneration, were people do not realize the
changes of their abilities due to impaired functions of
“context-recall” and “reexperiencing” [36]; 3) The cur-
rent evidence in neuroscience does not support the
redundant view: so-called “inner” or interoceptive
awareness of being alive is subserved by an interoceptive
reward-emotional pathway (e.g., in the inner feeling of
vitality), e.g., [32]. However, neuroimaging, single elec-
trode and related studies reveal that the brain pathways
subserving interoception are not tonically active in the
background from moment to moment [37], and there-
fore, in their very intermittency, not a sine qua non
(contra Thompson) for conscious experience. Moreover,
such putative tonic activity as an ongoing tagging would
n o tb ep a r s i m o n i o u sf r o mt h ep o i n to fv i e wo fb r a i n
evolution which conserves its limited resources (i.e.,
excitosis and reuptake or recycling of vital but finitely
available neurotransmitters, such as dopamine) to signal
precisely those events which hold some significance for
the organism or the organism’s survival. That is, the
interoceptive signalling (e.g., Damasio’s so-called somatic
markers) so far as it indicates important moments of
“salience” (presumably relevant to the organism’s
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and thus, to be noticed and learned by the subject, is
activated phasically (i.e., involving a “prediction error”
between expected events and outcomes which are better
or worse than expected which then activates dopaminer-
gic and other signalling) [38].
There is the additional problem, which we call here, a
“soft” problem (to distinguish it from the “hard pro-
blem”, or mind-body-duality, and the related “explana-
tory gap” between phenomenal-mental experience
(qualia) and neural process we have been discussing up
till now): even if we perform “reduction” in a Husserlian
sense, we are never totally free in our reflection from
historical consciousness, and from language which
makes such methodic reflective “reduction possible.”
H.-G. Gadamer [39] called this inevitable historical con-
sciousness the pre-reflective precondition of understand-
ing (präreflexive Vorstruktur des Verstehens). Moreover,
we are not able (contra Schwartz & Wiggins) to “start
from both sides - from the side of what empirical
science can tell us about inorganic and organic reality
and from the side of our own direct experience of life in
ourselves and in others” [1]. These perspectives are not
only not the same, they methodically exclude one
another in what Viktor von Weizsäcker [15] calls a
Gestalt-circle (Gestaltkreis). Their difference depends on
the respective way, or applied method which brings
“things” into focus. With respect to the phenomenon of
“life”, it is not at all clear whether these different,
mutually exclusive approaches focus on the same phe-
nomenon. Obviously there is a difference between
observing living cells through a microscope and under-
standing Homer’s concept of life. At any rate, we
acknowledge that certain characteristics may be “phy-
siognomically” g i v e nw h e ne x p e r i e n c i n gs o m e t h i n g
which is alive, or saying something about the
structure of our experience as a living being. Viktor von
Weizsäcker, who, as we already noted, is regarded as the
“founder” of psychosomatic medicine in Germany, had
argued that we must introduce the concept of subjectiv-
ity into the study of life or biology. However, as reflect-
ing subjectivity, we do not have access to the “hidden
unity” b e t w e e nm i n da n db o d yi nw h a tv o nW e i z s ä c k e r
calls the fundamental relationship (Grundverhältnis) to
our own being. Mind and body are, as can be said with
reference to Aristotle, rather experienced as “two sides
o ft h es a m ec o i n ” [40,41]). That is, mind and body are
in “hidden” unity or Gestaltkreis, which is not given
directly to consciousness whether in pre-reflective naïve
experiencing, or the reflection on this experiencing. In
our view, it is only through acknowledging this human
finitude (rather than claiming that “mind-body dualism”
has been overcome) that a psychosomatic medicine or a
philosophically informed psychiatry can be properly
practiced.
IV. Teleological Qualities of Life
If we accept the formerly described aporia of trying to
resolve reflective and pre-reflective, or “reflective” and
“natural” e x p e r i e n c e ,w ec o m et ot h ec o n c l u s i o nt h a t
the “teleological quality of life” depends on a self-reflec-
tive act. Of course, we prereflectively experience our
behaviour as goal-directed; there is “telos” in all beha-
viour in this sense, even in the most accustomed or
habitually motivated behaviours. However, this is not
equivalent with “teleology” which always implies explicit
teleological interpretation. A rolling stone does not roll
as it were on teleological accounts. Rather, so-called tel-
eological qualities are only given when (self)-conscious
beings interpret their own experiences in a broader
behavioural context. This does not diminish the quality
of teleological interpretations, but it clarifies their status.
Notably when Husserl describes a drive-intentionality
(Triebintentionalität) as fundamental to the passive ori-
ginary association (Urassoziation) of each “living” pre-
sent or current moment of consciousness, he means
that we proleptically strive for completeness of the
meaning of each experienced event as it passes in time
consciousness (see also [15]). However, even here, the
teleology is provisional, an anticipated totality of mean-
ing, which is always reliant on further perspectival
refinements or elaborations of the original experiencing.
In a similar manner, Kant instructs us about our episte-
mological limits. According to Kant, it is not possible to
decide the overall or all encompassing ("metaphysical”)
sense and meaning of our being alive. It is also impossi-
ble for us to decide whether - despite its obvious impor-
tance for ethical decision-making (i.e., a metaphysics of
morals) - there is such a “metaphysical” sense at all (in
the so-called “teleological limits” of the regulative idea).
In his “Kant-Crisis” of 1801, the German writer and
novelist, Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811) [42-44],
experienced this insight as highly vexing to his own
sense of existence. Later in the century, Arthur Scho-
penhauer (1788-1860) described the foreboding conse-
quences when the meaning of existence remains non-
securable in a “metaphysical” sense: “To what end the
entire tragic-comedy (of our lives) occurs is not to be
determined even remotely. Moreover, there is no audi-
ence, and the actors of life simply just hold out in what
seems to be endless toil, with little, or a merely negative
pleasure.” [ [ 4 5 ] ,B d . 3 ,p p .4 1 6 - 7 ,o u rt r a n s l a t i o n ] .A s
argued above, these limitations are in a radical sense
dependent on the “hard problem”, which we have refor-
mulated as the difference between our “reflective” and
our “natural” experience (and the attendant problem of
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such irritative-affective accounts of biologic subjectivity
do not overlook its very structure as enabling hidden
unity with itself and its environment as von Weizsäcker,
pointed out [15,32]. The latter is not possible by collap-
sing the dualism - by jumping over the explanatory gap -
but through acknowledging the relationship of mind and
body as one that intrinsically (but concealedly) connects
them.
The knowledge of the limits to our own metaphysical
reflections leads to the awareness that the experienced
meaning of our life is deeply intertwined with the way we
live. This was painfully obvious to the existentialists who
argued that we ultimately take responsibility for the
meaning of our own lives. We therefore agree with a
modified version of Schwartz’ and Wiggins’ thesis. Rather
than claiming as they do that “Life is thus teleological:
the present activity of the living being aims at its own
future being”, we offer the following: “Life seems teleolo-
gical for subjects when they are in the situation of aiming
at anticipating their own future in their present activity,
and at the same time, are reflectively aware of their pre-
sumably pre-reflective and accustomed aiming.” If we
refine their conclusion in that way, we acknowledge that
people experience a teleological quality in their embodied
life-situation. But this teleological quality is only grasped
as it is consciously given. To experience it affords its
active “reconstruction” in a subsequent reflective act,
while all the time referring to one’s “natural experience,”
the putative pre-reflective experienced directedness of
one’s behaviour, on which the teleological interpretation
is modelled in a structural sense. In other words, the
experienced teleological quality of life can only be under-
stood as an interpretation with constant and undeniable
reference to this experienced behavioural structure or
actional structure (”Handlungsstruktur”, see also [46]).
V. Discussion
Schwartz’ and Wiggins’ [1] suggestion that the phenom-
enon of life is given in a polarized way is attractive and
helpful and certainly has its precedents (e.g., Plessner,
von Weizsäcker). For example, von Weizsäcker [15]
writes: “Death is not opposite to life, but rather a coun-
ter-player or antagonist to procreation and birth; birth
and death rather comport themselves like the back and
front sides of life, and not as logically mutually exclusive
opposites. Life is birth and death” (p. v, our translation).
Admittedly, we are not be able to “introduce value into
an otherwise value-free universe” in the sense that we
could freely invent values without them being defined by
our “natural experience” (contra Sartre, but in consilience
with Scheler). It is nevertheless a reflective act in which
an experienced givenness (e.g. a certain circumstance) is
named as a given value. Reflection allows us to describe
our own experience of being alive in polarizing qualities
as inside and outside, being embodied/embedded vs.
being disembodied and sovereign, sameness and proces-
sual change, self and other. Yet the distinction between
pre-reflective and reflective lived experience is surely one
of the most polarizing and most vexing!
F o re x a m p l e ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oi n t e r p r e tt h el i f eo fa
neuron as it finds its way to appropriate targets in
migratory neurogenesis, for example, to be “teleological”
i no u rh u m a ns e n s e .H o w e v e r ,t h i sm a ym e r e l yb ei n
psychoanalytic terms the “projection” of animistic belief.
Although clearly unable to say anything without such
neural activity, we nevertheless are also unable to state
what it is like to be this nerve cell. We remain critical
when speculating on the teleologic character of life,
organisms or processes outside the experience of goal-
directedness of our own human consciousness. For
example, Schwartz and Wiggins [1]: “The being that the
activity is geared toward preserving is the organism’s
future being... Life is thus teleological.” (p. 3). But is it
really a “future” life that the organism is geared toward
preserving from moment to moment, or rather, is it
only its current being-alive which the animal strives to
preserve but which displaces itself which each new “now”
into what we, as observers, call a “future.” Although the
animal procreates and often cares for its young, the ethi-
cal concern of preserving life and the environment for
future generations is, as Jonas [47] himself argues, an
exclusively human responsibility (as is, vice versa, the
possibility to end one’sl i f eo no n e ’s own explicit
account). The human affective-openness to world (Wel-
toffenheit), the vulnerability to a future which is not yet,
i.e., anticipatory affective alterity as subjectively “felt,”
is for the phenomenologic anthropologists (e.g.,
Binswanger, Plessner, von Weizsäcker), something we
can only attribute to human existence (not something
we can speculatively attribute to “animal minds”). More-
over, “meaning” and the human task of finding meaning
in existence is never coincident with life (as can be seen
in the well-known fact that we, as human beings, are
able to utterly despair, as Kierkegaard argued [[48],
p. 9ff.]). It is always an excess, an overshooting, precisely
because it always undershoots, never quite captures the
living that “underlies” it as its hidden source. Similarly,
Tulving and other cognitive psychologists attribute men-
tal “time travel,” the ability to have explicit retrospective
and prospective episodic memories, and thus an explicit
future, and its underlying neurocircuitry, to a specifically
human awareness [see [23]; though of course, this may
not be the final word on this topic].
As Schwartz and Wiggins point out, those who claim
that we are able to make such “teleological” accounts draw
on a metaphysical dualism. They animate things of the
world as if those were self-conscious in a human way, yet
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tation which depends on their preferred way of accessing
their world experience or world-view (in Dilthey’ss e n s e ) .
Such approaches may attempt to justify a bodiless soul
which, from the standpoint of thought alone is possible
to conceptualize as a metaphysical entity but is not jus-
tified according to phenomenology’s own critical
method [49]. The relationship to the presumed given-
ness of self-evidence in delusions may have a similar
structure [50,51]. From this point of view, it is not
Darwins’se v o l u t i o n a r yt h e o r yt h a tk e e p su sf r o m
departing to “Pandora”, but it is the (phenomenological)
methodically-conscious attitude ("methodenkritische
Einstellung”). As a child of enlightenment, Darwin also
advocates methodically critical thinking. We propose
that the difference between “natural experience” and
“reflective experience,” and how this difference still con-
tributes to the hard problem, should serve as antidote
for those who search futilely for “Pandora.” We should
remind them, and we may also thank Schwartz and
Wiggins’ recent and thoughtful article for this reminder,
of human finitude and our own epistemological limits.
Declaration of competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
JS, CB and AM conceptualized, drafted and revised the manuscript and
contributed equally to its development. All three authors read and approved
the final manuscript.
Author details
1Department of Philosophy, Karl Franzens University Graz, Graz, Austria.
2Department of Psychiatry, Social Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Hannover
Medical School, Hannover, Germany.
3Department of Clinical Psychology,
Chicago School of Professional Psychology, Chicago (IL), USA.
Received: 7 May 2010 Accepted: 31 October 2010
Published: 31 October 2010
References
1. Schwartz MA, Wiggins OP: Psychosomatic medicine and the philosophy
of life. Philosophy Ethics and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:2.
2. Bloom P: Descartes’ Baby New York: Basic Books; 2004.
3. Bloom P, Weisberg DS: Childhood origins of adult resistance to science.
Science 2007, 316(5827):996-997.
4. Stern D: The interpersonal world of the infant New York: Basic Books; 1971.
5. Hume D: A Treatise of Human Nature Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000.
6. Wachowski A, Wachowski L: Matrix Warner Bros.; 1999.
7. Schlimme JE: Wollen wir uns unserer selbst vergewissern? Zur Debatte
um die menschliche Willensfreiheit und den neuronalen Determinismus.
Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie und Psychiatrie 2007, 158:97-106.
8. Cameron J: Avatar. Departure to Pandora. 20th Century Fox 2009.
9. Levine J: Materialism and Qualia: the Explanatory Gap. Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 1983, 64:354-361.
10. Seebohm T: Die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie
Bonn: Bouvier Verlag: Bonn; 1962.
11. Mishara AL: Husserl and Freud: time, memory and the unconscious.
Husserl Studies 1990, 7:29-58.
12. Wiggins OP: Commentary on self-consciousness, mental agency, and the
clinical psychopathology of thought insertion. Philos Psychiatr Psychol
1994, 1:11-12.
13. Wiggins OP, Spitzer M: Cognitive science. In Encyclopedia of
Phenomenology. Edited by: Embree L, Behnke EA, Carr D, Evans JC, Huertas-
Jourda J, Kockelmans JJ, McKenna WR, Mickunas A, Mohanly JN, Seebohm
TM, Zaner RM. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1997:101-104.
14. Henrich D: Der Grund im Bewußtsein. Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Denken
(1794-1795) Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; 1992.
15. von Weizsäcker V: Der Gestaltkreis. Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnnehmen und
Bewegen. 4 edition. Stuttgart: Georg Thieme Verlag; 1950.
16. Jaspers K: Allgemeine Psychopathologie Heidelberg Berlin: Springer; 1913.
17. Rinofner-Kreidl S: Mediane Phänomenologie Würzburg: Königshausen
&Neumann; 2003.
18. Rinofner-Kreidl S: Zur Idee des Methodenpartikularismus in Jaspers’
Allgemeiner Psychopathologie. In Karl Jaspers’ Allgemeine Psychopathologie
zwischen Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Praxis. Edited by: Rinofner-Kreidl S,
Wiltsche HA. Königshausen 2008:75-94.
19. Mishara AL: Kafka, paranoic doubles and the brain: hypnagogic vs.
hyper-reflexive models of disrupted self in neuropsychiatric disorders
and anomalous conscious states. Philosophy Ethics and Humanities in
Medicine 2010, 5:13.
20. Plessner H: Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. 2 edition. Berlin: de
Gruyter; 1965.
21. Mishara AL: Human ambivalence to body: Precondition for social
cognition and its disruption in neuropsychiatric disorders. Philos Psychiatr
Psychol 2009, 15:234-7.
22. Schlimme JE: Addiction and self-determination. A phenomenological
approach. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2010, 31:49-62.
23. Bonnemann C, Mishara AL: Phenomenologic and Computational Models of
Disrupted Time Consciousness during the Patient’s Experience of Traumatic
Flashbacks .
24. Binswanger L: Schizophrenie Pfullingen: Neske; 1957.
25. Conrad K: Die beginnende Schizophrenie. Versuch einer Gestaltanalyse des
Wahns Stuttgart: Thieme Verlag; 1958.
26. Henry M: Material Phenomenology New York: Fordham University Press; 2008.
27. Henry M: In The essence of manifestation. Edited by: Etzkorn G. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff; 1973.
28. Husserl E: Analysen zur passiven Synthesis aus Forschungsmanuscripten 1918-
1926 The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; 1966.
29. Fuchs T: The challenge of neuroscience: Psychiatry and phenomenology
today. Psychopathology 2002, 35:319-326.
30. Fuchs T: Das Gehirn. Ein Beziehungsorgan Stuttgart: Kohlhammer; 2008.
31. Plessner H: Lachen und Weinen Frankfurt/Main: Fischer; 1970.
32. Mishara AL: Autoscopia: Disruption of self-experience in neuropsychiatric
disorders and anomalous conscious states. In Handbook of
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Edited by: Gallagher S, Schmicking D.
Berlin: Springer; 2010:591-634.
33. Plessner H: Gesammelte Schriften Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp; 1980.
34. Thompson E: Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind
Cambridge; Harvard University Press; 2007.
35. Tulving E: Episodic memory: from mind to brain. Annu Rev Psychol 2002,
53:1-25.
36. Söderlund H, Black SE, Miller BL, Freedman M, Levine B: Episodic memory
and Regional Atrophy in Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration.
Neuropsychologia 2008, 46:127-136.
37. Critchley HD, Wiens S, Rotshtein P, Ohman A, Dolan RJ: Neural systems
supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience 2004, 7:189-195.
38. Mishara AL, Corlett PR: Are delusions biologically adaptive? Salvaging the
doxastic shear pin. Behav Brain Sci 2009, 32:530-1.
39. Gadamer H-G: Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen
Hermeneutik Tübingen: Mohr; 1960, [Truth and method. 2nd ed. Trans. by J
Weinsheimer, DG Marshall. New York: Continuum; 1993].
40. Schwartz MA, Wiggins OP, Spitzer M: Psychotic experience and disordered
thinking: a reappraisal from new perspectives. J Nerv Ment Dis 1997,
185:176-187.
41. Mishara AL, Schwartz MA: Psychopathology in the Light of Emergent
Trends in the Philosophy of Consciousness, Neuropsychiatry and
Phenomenology. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 1997, 10:383-389.
42. Cassirer E: Henrich von Kleist und die Kantische Philosophie Berlin: Reuther &
Reichard; 1919.
43. Muth L: Kleist und Kant Köln: Kölner Universitäts-Verlag; 1958.
44. Schlimme JE: Heinrich von Kleist. Krise und schöpferisches Überwinden.
Psychiatrische Praxis 2001, 28:230-234.
Schlimme et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:15
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/15
Page 7 of 845. Schopenhauer A: Züricher Ausgabe. Werke in zehn Bänden Zürich: Diogenes;
1977.
46. Spaemann R, Löw R: Die Frage Wozu? München & Zürich: Piper; 1980.
47. Jonas H: The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the
Technological Age Transl. Hans Jonas and David Herr. Chicago & London:
The University of Chicago Press; 1984.
48. Kierkegaard S: In Die Krankheit zum Tode.. 4 edition. Edited by: Hirsch E.
Gütersloher Verlagshaus; Gütersloh; 1992:, [Anti-Climacus (Søren
Kierkegaard): Sygdommen til Døden. Kjøbenhavn 1849].
49. Janicaud D: Phenomenology and the ‘theological turn’: the French debate
New York: Fordham University Press; 2000.
50. Schlimme JE: Paranoid atmospheres: psychiatric knowledge and
delusional realities. Philosophy Ethics and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14.
51. Mishara AL: The ‘Unconscious’ in Paranoid Delusional Psychosis?
Phenomenology, Neuroscience, Psychoanalysis. In Founding
Psychoanalysis. Edited by: Lohmar D, Brudzinska J. New York: Springer; .
doi:10.1186/1747-5341-5-15
Cite this article as: Schlimme et al.: No departure to “Pandora"? Using
critical phenomenology to differentiate “naive” from “reflective”
experience in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine (A comment on
Schwartz and Wiggins, 2010). Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in
Medicine 2010 5:15.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Schlimme et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:15
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/15
Page 8 of 8